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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
such former methods of filing, indicing, etc. Such a method
of preservation seemed unsatisfactory, and old Section 64 was
therefore expressly restored in 1925 in its present form. This
restoration, however, did not serve as an amendment to Sec-
tion 71 or as introducing a one-year period in New York City."
On the other hand, Judge Noonan in his opinion 6 felt that
Section 71 was restricted in its application to counties outside of New
York City by virtue of the Laws of 1925 which revived the old Sec-
tion 64, and that it was necessary in the counties of New York City
for the vendor to refile at the expiration of the first year.
From this labyrinth of confusion the new bill introduced prom-
ises much-needed relief. Aside from the fact that it would definitely
settle the time necessary for refiling in the counties of New York
City, it expedites the work of the frequently overburdened lawyer.
Lawyers who have been called upon -to search back three years for
copies of conditional sales contracts on file in the register's office, can
appreciate the benefits that would accrue if the new bill introduced-
necessitating refiling in New York City at the expiration of one year
-were .to becom law. The Legislature, in distinguishing between
the counties of New York City and the rest of the state as to the time
of refiling, perforce must have realized that the simplification of
searches was to be desired in the densely populated counties of New
York City. We cannot help but agree that a law which requires
searches of the records for one year instead of three will save much
time and effort to the busy lawyer, to whom time is usually of the
essence.
JOSEPH A. SCHIAVONE.
QUALIFICATION OF AN ATTORNEY AS A COMPETENT WITNESS IN
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.-In order to foster and protect the relation-
ship of attorney and client, the rule was established early in the com-
mon law, that confidential communications between attorney and
client are privileged.
"In ancient times, parties litigant were in the habit of
coming into court, and prosecuting or defending their suits, in
person. Subsequently, however, as law-suits multiplied, and
modes of judicial proceeding became more complex and for-
mal, it became necessary to have these suits conducted by per-
sons skilled in the law and in the practice of the courts. This
necessity gave rise, at an early day, to the class of attorneys;
to facilitate the business of the courts, it was important that
these men should be employed. But as parties were not then
obliged to testify in their own cases, and could not be compelled
Gimbel Bros. v. Brown, New York Law Journal, June 12, 1929 at 1301.
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to disclose facts known only to themselves, they would hesitate
to employ professional men, and make the necessary disclos-
ures to them, if the facts thus communicated were thus within
the reach of their opponent. To encourage the employment
of attorneys, therefore, it became indispensable to extend to
them the immunity enjoyed by the party."'
The prohibition against disclosure is not confined to communica-
tions made in contemplation or in the progress of a cause of action
but applies to any matter which is the proper subject of the profes-
sional employment.2  However, it must be intended by the client that
the communications shall be confidential. If made in the presence of
a third party or if the client himself disclose it, the privilege does not
apply because the communication is not deemed to be made in profes-
sional confidence.3  The essence of privilege which may be availed
of by the client, lies in the intention on his part that the communica-
tion be regarded as confidential.
In the case of negotiations between attorney and a client who is
making a will, the common law rule is that the attorney is prohibited
from making disclosures during the lifetime of the testator, but
after his death the attorney may testify as to matters tending to estab-
lish and support the will.
"The reason for this exception to the general doctrine
excluding confidential professional communications is that the
rule is designed for the protection of the client, and it cannot
be said to be for the interest of a testator, in a controversy
between parties all of whom claim under him to have those
declarations and transactions excluded which are necessary to
a proper fulfillment of his will. Indeed, according to the
view entertained by some courts, a client by requesting his
attorney to draw his will impliedly asks him to do and say
whatever might at any time and place be requisite for the
purpose of establishing the integrity of the will, thereby waiv-
ing the protection of privileged communications and releasing
the attorney from the obligation of secrecy." '
Under the common law in New York, this exception was ac-
corded recognition without question and after the death of a testator
'Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330, 332 (1864).2 Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72 (1881).
SRosseau v. Bleau, 131 N. Y. 177, 30 N. E. 52 (1892) ; People v. Buchanan,
145 N. Y. 1, 39 N. E. 846 (1895) ; Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N. Y. 213, 61 N. E.
255 (1901); Bauman v. Steingester. 213 N. Y. 328, 107 N. E. 578 (1915),
where it was said at p. 333: "In such cases the attorney is permitted to testify
not because the privilege has been waived, but because the communication, not
having been made in confidence, was not privileged."
'28 R. C. L. 551, 141 citing 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 108.
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the attorney who drew the will was permitted to testify as to its
preparation and execution. 5
When the Legislature of the state codified the common law on
the subject no specific reference was made in the statute to cases in-
volving testamentary instruments. In construing the enactment, the
judicial opinion was that since no reference bad been made in the
statute to the exception, the Legislature intended to abolish it.
"It is difficult to see upon a reading of the sections in
question how any such idea (that said sections do not apply
to testamentary dispositions) came to be entertained, because
its language is positive and unequivocal, and makes no excep-
tions as to the class of cases to which they shall apply; and
they must necessarily apply to testamentary cases as well as to
any others, unless the plain provisions of the sections are to
be repealed by judicial legislation. They require no construc-
tion but are plain and explicit." 6
In the Coleman case, it is significant that the contestants to the
will were attempting to introduce evidence by the attorney in order to
establish insanity of the testator and undue influence. It is submitted
that were the evidence offered in support of the will by the propo-
ents, the Court would not have been so positive in its refusal tojudicially legislate-remedial statutes often are construed liberally.
However, where the testator requested the attorney who drew
the will to become a subscribing witness it was held that this consti-
tuted a waiver of the privilege, for the intent of the testator that the
attorney should testify in the probate proceedings, was manifest.7
Accordingly, in 1892 the statute was amended to read:
"But nothing herein contained shall be construed to dis-
qualify an attorney on the probate of a will heretofore exe-
cuted or offered for probate or hereafter to be executed or
offered for probate, from becoming a witness as to its prepara-
tion and execution in case such attorney is one of the sub-
scribing witnesses thereto." 8
With the passage of this amendment it was obvious that the
Legislature meant to extend the rule of privilege to cases of testa-
mentary instruments, except where the attorney became a subscribing
witness. Little choice was left for the Court but to so hold, 9 and
the rule so exists today in New York, contrary to that in mostjurisdictions.' 0
r Sheridan v. Houghton, 16 Hun 628 (1880), aff'd 84 N. Y. 643 (1881);
Sanford v. Sanford, 61 Barb. 293 (1872) ; Matter of Chase, 41 Hun 203.
'Mason v. Williams, 53 Hun 398, 400, 6 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1889).
'Matter of Coleman, 111 N. Y. 220, 228, 19 N. E. 71 (1888) ; Cf. Loder v.
Whelpley, 111 N. Y. 239, 18 N. E. 874 (1888).
'Added by Ch. 514, Laws of 1892.
'Matter of Cunnion. 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648 (1911).
oIncluding California, In re Dominicis Estate, 151 Cal. 181, 90 Pac. 448(1907) ; New Jersey, In re Veazey's Will, 80 N. J. Eq. 466, 85 Atl. 176 (1912) ;
Iowa, where in spite of-a similar enactment in the Code, it has been held that
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The enactment of the proposed amendment to Section 354 of the
Civil Practice Act would restore the rule of the common law as it
existed before the first codification, by providing:
" * * * But nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued to disqualify an attorney or his employees in the probate
of a will * * * from becoming a witness as to its preparation
and execution, whether such attorney is, or is not, one of the
subscribing witnesses thereto, * * *"
When a client executes a will it is undoubtedly his intention
that the execution and especially the contents of the will be kept secret
during his life. Obviously such an intent does not prevail after his
death-it is his desire that the will then be established, published and
its provisions carried out."' No one is in a better position to effec-
tuate the desires of the testator than the attorney who drew the will.
When the reason for the rule of privilege ceases to obtain, the applica-
tion of the rule should cease. The state endows its citizens with the
privilege of testamentary disposition. The burden of proving the
proper exercise of the privilege is on the proponents of the will who
thus represent the testator. Obstacles should not be placed in the
way when there is no justification for their existence. However, the
statute or its application should be qualified so as to apply only to
those cases where the evidence to be adduced is in support of the will.
Otherwise a dangerous weapon will be placed in the hands of un-
scrupulous attorneys who may be induced, by bribe or otherwise, to
use the knowledge obtained through their position of confidence so as
to favor interests detrimental to their erstwhile clients.
SIDNEY MOERMAN.
JURISDICTION OF NON-RESIDENT IMIOTORIST.-By the former
provisions of Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law 1 it was pro-
vided that a non-resident operator of a motor vehicle or motorcycle
should be deemed by such operation on a public highway in this state
to have appointed the secretary of state to be his attorney upon whom
summons might be served in any action against him, growing out of
any accident or collision in which he might have been involved while
engaged in such operation. Further details of the method of effect-
ing such service were contained in the section. The constitutionality
of a Massachusetts statute, similar to ours, was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Hess v. Pawloski.2
testamentary cases are not included within the meaning of the statute; Iowa,
Conway v. Rock, 139 Iowa 162, 117 N. W. 273 (1908) ; and in Arkansas the
common law rule prevails despite a statute similar to the one in New York,
Broadway v. Thompson, 139 Ark. 542, 214 S. W. 27 (1919). See cases col-
lected in American Digest "Witnesses" Key 202 and 217.
U 5 Wigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 2314.
Laws of 1929, Ch. 54.
2274 U. S. 13, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632 (1927).
